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Abstract—We consider a one-time digital signature scheme
recently proposed by Persichetti and show that a successful key
recovery attack can be mounted with limited complexity. The
attack we propose exploits a single signature intercepted by the
attacker, and relies on a statistical analysis performed over such
a signature, followed by information set decoding. We assess the
attack complexity and show that a full recovery of the secret
key can be performed with a work factor that is far below the
claimed security level. The efficiency of the attack is motivated
by the sparsity of the signature, which leads to a significant
information leakage about the secret key.
Index Terms—Code-based cryptography, cryptanalysis, digital
signatures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Code-based cryptosystems, introduced by McEliece in 1978
[1], rely on the hardness of the Syndrome Decoding Prob-
lem (SDP), which has been proven to be NP-complete for
general random codes [2]. The best SDP solvers for general
codes, known as Information Set Decoding (ISD) algorithms,
were first introduced by Prange in 1962 [3] and significantly
improved over years (see [4], [5] and references therein).
However, all current ISD algorithms are characterized by an
exponential complexity, even when implemented on quantum
computers [6]. Since SDP is one of the oldest and most
studied hard problems, and no polynomial time solver is
currently known, code-based cryptosystems are among the
most promising solutions for post-quantum cryptography [7].
However, designing a secure and efficient digital signature
scheme based on coding theory is still an open problem. The
main difficulty is represented by the fact that, typically, in
these systems the plaintext and ciphertext domains do not
coincide. Therefore, applying decryption on a general string,
for example obtained through a hash function, may result in a
failure unless special solutions are adopted. Proposals trying
to address this issue have been proven not to be either efficient
or secure (or both, in the worst cases). A clear evidence of the
hardness of finding efficient digital signature schemes based
on codes is represented by the fact that no proposal of this
type is surviving within the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) competition for the standardization of
post-quantum primitives [8].
Historically, the first digital signature scheme based on
error correcting codes is the Courtois-Finiasz-Sendrier (CFS)
scheme [9], that uses high rate Goppa codes and follows a
hash-and-sign approach. This scheme is known to be unprac-
tical, since it has some security flaws (high rate Goppa codes
can be distinguished from random codes [10]) and requires
very large public-keys and long signature times.
In particular, some schemes might suffer from statistical
attacks, i.e., procedures that can break the system through the
observation of a sufficiently large number of signatures. In
such a case, the attacked systems are reduced to few-signatures
schemes or, in the most conservative assumption, to one-time
schemes (each key-pair is refreshed after just one signature).
For instance, the BBC+ scheme proposed in [11], which is
based on low-density generator matrix (LDGM) codes, has
been cryptanalized in [12] with a procedure that allows forging
valid signatures after the observation of thousands of signa-
tures, which limits the life of its keypairs [13]. Another recent
proposal is Wave [14], based on generalized (U ;U+V ) codes.
A cryptanalysis procedure of Wave based on the statistical
analysis of hundreds of signatures has been proposed in [15].
However, such a procedure has been disproved in [16], since
it is referred to a degraded version of the scheme.
In this paper, we consider a one-time signature scheme that
was recently proposed by Persichetti [17]. Such a scheme is
obtained as a modification of Stern’s identification protocol
[18], and relies on Quasi-Cyclic (QC) codes, which allow
for both compact keys and low computational complexity.
However, as we show afterwards, this scheme suffers from
an attack which leads to a full recovery of the secret key and
whose complexity is far below the claimed security level. Our
attack is based on a statistical analysis performed on a single
signature, combined with an ISD algorithm.
Another attack against the same scheme has been indepen-
dently developed in [19]. The attack in [19] is based on Bit
Flipping (BF) decoding, which has the advantage of being
vary fast compared to other decoders. However, the success
probability of BF decoding cannot be predicted analytically.
Moreover, in case of a decoding failure, it is not possible to
perform further randomized attempts of decoding through BF.
Differently from [19], our attack exploits ISD, which permits
us to obtain a closed-form formula for the average number of
iterations and the relevant complexity needed for a successful
attack, which depend only on the system parameters. So, while
the feasibility of the attack in [19] can only be assessed
through numerical simulations, we do not rely on simulations:
through an theoretical approach, we show that the security of
the scheme is reduced to the complexity of an SDP instance,
which is far below any reasonable security level. In particular,
our analysis shows how the security of the system is related to
the hardness of solving an SDP instance in which the weight of
the searched vector is particularly low. Through this approach,
we can make general statements about the effectiveness of the
attack on modified parameters sets, showing that meaningful
security levels cannot be achieved even resorting to extreme
choices for the parameters set.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce
the notation used. In Section III we describe the scheme and its
design strategy. In Section IV we describe our attack procedure
and derive estimates of its complexity. Finally, in Section V
we report some conclusions.
II. NOTATION
We denote as R the polynomial ring F2[x]/(x
p+1), where
p is an integer and x is a symbolic variable. We use bold letters
to denote vectors over R2, in the form a(x) = [a0(x), a1(x)],
with ai(x) ∈ R. Each a(x) ∈ R
2 can be unambiguously
represented as a vector a ∈ F2p2 in the form
a = [a0,0, a0,1, · · · , a0,p−1, a1,0, a1,1, · · · , a1,p−1],
where ai,j is the j-th coefficient of the i-th polynomial, ai(x),
in a(x). Let F2 be the binary field. Given a vector a over F2,
we denote as aˆ the vector obtained by lifting its entries over
the integer domain Z; the same notation is used for vectors of
polynomials. Operations involving lifted vectors are performed
in the integer domain (i.e., 1 + 1 = 2). Given a polynomial
a(x), we define its Hamming weight, wt{a(x)}, as the number
of its non-null coefficients. For a vector of polynomials a(x),
the Hamming weight corresponds to the sum of the Hamming
weights of its elements. The support of a polynomial a(x),
denoted as ℑ{a(x)}, is the set containing the indexes of the
non-null coefficients of a(x). Clearly, the Hamming weight of
a polynomial corresponds to the cardinality of its support.
We denote as Dn,w the uniform distribution of all binary n-
uples with weight w. Then, the expression a
$
←− Dn,w means
that a is randomly picked among all the elements in Dn,w.
Since the distribution is uniform, each vector of weight w is
picked with probability 1/
(
n
w
)
. In the following, we consider
only the case of n = 2p. With some abuse of notation, the
expression a(x)
$
←− Dn,w means that a(x) is randomly picked
among all pairs of polynomials having vectors of coefficients
in R2, each with Hamming weight w.
III. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The one-time digital signature scheme we are considering
is built upon a public polynomial h(x), that is fixed by the
protocol. We denote as syndh : R
2 → R the function that
takes as input a vector a(x) = [a0(x), a1(x)] and outputs
a0(x) + a1(x)h(x). The scheme additionally requires a hash
function Hδ(b) that takes as input b and outputs a weight-δ
polynomial. Parameters of the scheme are the integers p, w(e),
w(y), w(c) (with w(e), w(y), w(c) ≪ p).
The key generation is shown in Algorithm 1; the signing
key (i.e., secret key) is a vector e(x) = [e0(x), e1(x)], such
that wt{e(x)} = w(e). The verification key (i.e., public key)
is obtained through the application of syndh on the secret
key. The signature generation and verification are shown,
respectively, in Algorithms 2 and 3. The signature verification
algorithm returns a boolean variable ⊥ that is false when the
signature is valid and true otherwise.
Algorithm 1 Key generation
Input: integers p, w(e), w(y)
Output: signing key e(x), verification key se(x)
1: procedure
2: e(x)
$
←− D2p,w(e)
3: se(x)← syndh{e(x)}
4: return e(x), se(x)
Algorithm 2 Signature generation
Input: message m, signing key e(x), integers w(y), w(c)
Output: signature σ = {c(x), z(x)}
1: procedure
2: y(x)
$
←− D2p,w(y)
3: sy(x)← syndh{y(x)}
4: c(x)← Hw(c){[m, sy(x)]}
5: z(x)← c(x)e(x) + y(x)
6: σ ← {c(x), z(x)}
7: return σ
Algorithm 3 Signature verification
Input: message m, verification key se(x),
Input: signature {c(x), z(x)}
Output: verification confirmation ⊥
1: procedure
2: ⊥ ← 0
3: if wt{z(x)} ≤ w(c)w(e) + w(y) then
4: ⊥ ← 1
5: return ⊥ ⊲ Signature rejected
6: sz(x)← syndh{z(x)}
7: v(x)← c(x)se(x) + sz(x)
8: c′(x)← Hδ{[m, v(x)]}
9: if c′(x) 6= c(x) then
10: ⊥ ← 1
11: return ⊥ ⊲ Signature rejected
12: return ⊥ ⊲ Signature accepted
A. Security analysis
The security of the scheme is based on the hardness of the
SDP that, in the binary case, is defined as follows.
Syndrome Decoding Problem
Given H ∈ Fr×n2 , s ∈ F
r
2 and w ∈ N, find e ∈ F
n
2 such that
wt{e} ≤ w and HeT = s.
The SDP is a well-known problem in coding theory, and has
been proven to be NP-complete [2]; in particular, the solution
of the SDP can be unique only when w does not exceed the
Gilbert-Varshamov (GV) distance d(GV), that is defined as the
greatest integer such that
∑d(GV)−2
j=0
(
n−1
j
)
< 2n−k. When w ≤
d(GV), the best solvers for SDP are ISD algorithms, whose
complexity crucially depends on w and on the code rate.
The security of the scheme is based on the fact that the
inversion of syndh requires the solution of an SDP instance.
Let H be the p×2p QC matrix obtained by concatenating the
identity with the circulant matrix having h(x) as first column.
Let e and se denote, respectively, the vectors associated to the
secret and the public key: then, the following relation holds
HeT = se. (1)
An opponent trying to recover the secret key e must solve an
SDP instance; thus, the weight of e cannot be smaller than
some security threshold value. In the verification procedure,
a crucial aspect is represented by the weight of z(x), which
has maximum value equal to w(c)w(e) + w(y). Indeed, the
authenticity of the signature is guaranteed if there is only one
vector z(x) such that
syndh{z(x)} = c(x)syndh{e(x)}+ syndh{y(x)}, (2)
since this proves that z(x) has been computed through the
signing key. Then, a necessary condition for such a vector to
be unique is
w(c)w(e) + w(y) ≤ d(GV). (3)
Obviously, the system is fully broken also if the opponent can
perform ISD on syndh{y(x)} = c(x)se(x) + sz(x): then,
even w(y) cannot be lower than some security threshold value.
Finally, we must take into account that z(x) is obtained
through linear operations involving sparse polynomials, one of
them being c(x), which is part of the signature, and is hence
public. In [17], the possibility of attacks exploiting such facts
has been considered; for this reason, the scheme has been
proposed only for the one-time signature case. However, as
we show next, the analysis of a single signature, combined
with an ISD algorithm, is enough to recover the secret key.
IV. AN EFFICIENT KEY RECOVERY ATTACK
We remember that the signature is composed by the pair
{c(x), z(x)}, with z(x) = c(x)e(x) + y(x). Let us write
c(x) =
∑
v∈ℑ{c(x)}
xv, (4)
where ℑ{c(x)} contains w(c) ≪ p distinct integers.
An opponent can compute the polynomials z
(v)
i (x) =
x−vzi(x), for i = 0, 1 and for all v ∈ ℑ{c(x)}; we have
z
(v)
i (x) = x
−vyi(x) + x
−vc(x)ei(x)
= x−vyi(x) + ei(x) +
∑
l∈ℑ{c(x)}
l 6=v
x−v+lei(x)
= y(v)(x) + ei(x) +
∑
l∈ℑ{c(x)}
l 6=v
e
(v−l)
i (x). (5)
The opponent can then lift all such polynomials in the integers
domain, and compute the sum
dˆi(x) =
p∑
j=0
dˆi,jx
j =
∑
v∈ℑ{c(x)}
zˆ
(v)
i (x), (6)
for i = 0, 1. We expect high coefficients in dˆi(x) to be
associated to ones in ei(x). In fact, all polynomials z
(v)
i (x) are
obtained as the sum of ei(x) with other sparse polynomials
that depend on the shift x−v . Hence, if an entry belongs to
the support of a large number of polynomials z
(v)
i (x), then it
also belongs to the support of ei(x) with high probability.
The opponent can exploit this fact to estimate the coeffi-
cients of e(x). In particular, let e′(x) = [e′0(x), e
′
1(x)] ∈ R
2
be a vector with coefficients
e′i,j =
{
0 if dˆi,j < b,
1 if dˆi,j ≥ b,
(7)
where b is an integer ≤ w(c). The vector e′(x) represents an
estimate of e(x), whose accuracy depends on the choice of b.
The opponent can then compute
s∗(x) = se(x) + syndh{e
′(x)}
= syndh{e(x)}+ syndh{e
′(x)}
= [e0(x) + e
′
0(x)] + h(x) [e1(x) + e
′
1(x)]
= syndh{e
∗(x)}, (8)
where e∗(x) = e(x)+e′(x). If s∗(x) = 0, then e′(x) = e(x),
otherwise ISD can be used to obtain e∗(x) from s∗(x), and
then the secret key can be recovered as e(x) = e′(x)+e∗(x).
The complexity of the whole attack crucially depends on
the weight of e∗(x), which is related to the accuracy of the
estimate e′(x). As shown in the next section, for the system
we consider it is always possible to choose b such that the
weight of e∗(x) has a high probability of being very small.
A. Attack complexity
Let us denote as w
(e)
i and w
(y)
i the weights of ei(x) and
yi(x), respectively. A specific weights partition is uniquely
determined by w
(e)
0 and w
(y)
0 , as w
(e)
1 = w
(e) − w
(e)
0 and
w
(y)
1 = w
(y) − w
(y)
0 . The probability to have this partition is
P
{
w
(e)
0 , w
(y)
0
}
=
( p
w
(e)
0
)( p
w(e)−w
(e)
0
)
( 2p
w(e)
)
( p
w
(y)
0
)( p
w(y)−w
(y)
0
)
( 2p
w(y)
) . (9)
Recall (5), and let us define
e˜
(v)
i (x) =
∑
l∈ℑ{c(x)}
l 6=v
e
(v−l)
i (x), (10)
from which z
(v)
i (x) = ei(x) + y
(v)
i (x) + e˜i(x). Let ρ
null
i be
the probability that a particular coefficient in the sum e˜i(x)+
y
(v)
i (x) is null. We can assume that each e
(v−l)
i (x) is a random
polynomial with weight w
(e)
i , and define
ρi =
w(c)−1∑
j=0
j even
(
w(c) − 1
j
)(
w
(e)
i
p
)j (
1−
w
(e)
i
p
)w(c)−1−j
,
(11)
such that ρnulli can be estimated as
ρnulli = (1− ρi)
w
(y)
i
p
+ ρi
(
1−
w
(y)
i
p
)
. (12)
Each null coefficient in e˜
(v)
i (x) + y
(v)
i (x) results in a match
between ei(x) and z
(v)
i (x); thus, the probability that a set
coefficient in ei(x) is also set in e
′
i(x) can be estimated as
ρseti =
w(c)∑
j=b
(
w(c)
j
)(
ρnulli
)j (
1− ρnulli
)w(c)−j
. (13)
Similarly, the probability that a null coefficient in ei(x) is set
in e′i(x) can be obtained as
ρ¬seti =
w(c)∑
j=b
(
w(c)
j
)(
1− ρnulli
)j (
ρnulli
)w(c)−j
. (14)
Let us denote as useti and as u
¬set
i the number of coefficients
that are correctly and incorrectly set in e′i(x); then, we have
wt{e∗i (x)} = w
(e)
i + u
¬set
i − u
set
i . (15)
Let us define
P seti (u
set
i ) =
(
w
(e)
i
useti
)
(ρseti )
useti (1− ρseti )
w
(e)
i
−useti ,
P¬seti (u
¬set
i ) =
(
p− w
(e)
i
u¬seti
)
(ρ¬seti )
u¬seti ·
(1− ρ¬seti )
p−w
(e)
i
−u¬seti . (16)
The probability that e∗i (x) has weight w
(e∗)
i results in
Pi
{
w
(e∗)
i
}
=
w(e)∑
uset
i
=max [0,w
(e)
i
−w
(e∗)
i
]
P seti (u
set
i )P
¬set
i (u
¬set),
(17)
where u¬set = w
(e∗)
i + u
set
i − w
(e)
i . Let δ = δ0 + δ1, then
P {wt(e∗) = δ} =
w(e)∑
w
(e)
0 =0
w(y)∑
w
(y)
0 =0
P
{
w
(e)
0 , w
(y)
0
}
·
·
δ∑
δ0=0
P0{δ0}P1{δ − δ0}. (18)
Through the probability distribution of wt{e∗(x)}, we can
estimate the effectiveness and the complexity of our cryptanal-
ysis. The first part of the attack consists in the computation
of s∗(x): since it only involves a limited number of shifts,
multiplications and sums, we can neglect the complexity of
this step. If s∗(x) = 0, then the opponent has already fully
recovered the secret key. In all the other cases, the opponent
applies ISD on s∗(x), in order to determine the vector e∗(x),
whose weight is unknown and is distributed according to Eq.
(18). For the sake of simplicity we consider the Lee-Brickell
ISD algorithm [20], which takes as input an integer j and, at
each iteration, picks an information set and tests all patterns
having a maximum of j ones in the selected positions: an
iteration is successful if the selected information set contains
a maximum of j errors. In particular, the complexity of each
iteration can be estimated as
Citer = p
3 +
j∑
l=0
(
p
l
)
. (19)
Let Piter denote the probability of success for a single
iteration. Then, we have
Piter =
w¯∑
δ=1
P{wt(e∗) = δ}
min{δ,j}∑
l=0
(
δ
l
)(
2p−δ
p−l
)
(
2p
p
) , (20)
where w¯ is a sufficiently large integer. The average complexity
of ISD can then be estimated as
CISD =
Citer
Piter
. (21)
As we show next, for all instances proposed in [17] we can
determine a value of b for which wt{e∗(x)} = 0 holds with
high probability or applying ISD on s∗(x) has extremely low
complexity. In particular, these statements are motivated by
the fact that, with overwhelming probability, e∗(x) has an
extremely low weight, such that finding it through an ISD
algorithm requires just a small number of iterations.
B. Results
In Fig. 1 we report the distribution of the weights of e∗(x)
for two instances proposed in [17]. The empirical distributions
have been obtained through numerical simulations on 10, 000
pairs of verification keys and signatures, and have been com-
pared with the theoretical ones expressed by (18), showing
everywhere an excellent agreement. As we can see, the weight
of e∗(x) assumes very low values with high probability. This
is a clear evidence of the system weakness against the attack.
In Table I we have considered the applicability of the attack
on the instances proposed in [17]; as we can see, all the in-
stances can be completely broken. Indeed, P{wt{e∗(x)} = 0}
always has high values: thus, with non-negligible probability,
the secret key can be fully recovered without invoking ISD.
When wt{e∗(x)} > 0, it is highly probable that e∗(x) has
an extremely low weight: this results in Piter having very
high values, only slightly influenced by the choice of w¯ (i.e.,
choosing w¯ = 40 is already enough to guarantee Piter ≈ 1).
Fig. 1. Probability distribution of wt{e∗(x)}.
TABLE I
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE KEY RECOVERY ATTACK INSTANCES PROPOSED
IN [17], FOR LEE-BRICKELL ISD WITH j = 2.
p w(e) w(y) w(c) b P{wt{e∗(x)} = 0} CISD
3072 85 85 7 5 2−3.37 235.10
4801 90 100 10 7 2−1.15 237.58
6272 125 125 10 7 2−1.84 238.37
9857 150 200 15 9 2−0.23 242.54
This means that the application of ISD normally requires a
very limited number of operations.
We can also show that changing the system parameters is not
enough to significantly raise the security level of the scheme.
In order to give an evidence of this fact, we have considered
the case of p = 4801, for which d(GV) = 1058, and tested
different values of w(e), w(y) and w(c). The results are reported
in Table II. As we can see, there are no significant changes in
the security of the system. In particular, the last three instances
in the table have been designed with a maximum weight of
z∗(x) that is close to 2d(GV). This choice is clearly extreme
since, as explained in Section III, this way the uniqueness
of the signature is no longer achievable. One might think to
apply some modifications to the protocol, to take into account
also this possibility in the signature verification algorithm.
However, our results should discourage the attempt.
V. CONCLUSION
We have discussed a serious weakness of a recently pro-
posed one-time digital signature scheme. Our analysis shows
that the secret key can be fully recovered with very low
TABLE II
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE KEY RECOVERY ATTACK ON SOME SYSTEM
INSTANCES WITH p = 4801, FOR LEE-BRICKELL ISD WITH j = 2.
w(e) w(y) w(c) b P{wt{e∗(x)} = 0} CISD
90 300 8 6 2−4.01 237.05
100 400 6 4 2−12.16 238.95
90 1000 10 7 2−13.10 239.18
90 100 20 12 2−0.46 238.56
180 100 10 7 2−16.60 254.98
complexity, and that changes in the system parameters are not
able to restore meaningful security levels. We point out that,
with a few modifications, our attack procedure can be applied
to structures different from the QC one. This is because it
exploits the sparsity of the signature. As this is an inherent
feature of the considered scheme, restoring its security might
require deep and structural changes.
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